But Gbagbo's defiance and the persistence of the regionally-backed winner of the November presidential run-off, Alassane Ouattara, has taken Cote d'Ivoire down another slippery slope. The country has known perpetual crisis since a 1999 coup and 2002 civil war that shook West Africa's dream state. The war ended in the 2007 Ouagadougou peace agreement, and the warring parties hesitantly found common ground and moved towards elections after more than five postponements and numerous disputes. A voter identification and registration process was riddled with obstacles. Northerners, whose close cultural links and affinity with northern neighbours Burkina Faso, had undermined their acceptance as full Ivorian citizens struggled to gain national acceptance through the voter identification process. It was a process tinged by the sensitive issue of 'Ivoirité' - a social construct that seeks to differentiate between residents on the basis of their 'Ivorianness'. It was this very same principle that was used to disquality Ouattara as a presidential candidate from the 2000 elections.
Although all parties eventually agreed on the UN-endorsed voter register and the polls happened, the results were always going to be up for contention. But I don't think anyone had for a moment, forseen an outcome in which both Gbagbo and Ouattara would eventually create parallel admnistrations. The electoral commision results gave Ouattara victory, and the UN agreed as did other regional observers. But Cote d'Ivoire's consitutional court thought otherwise alleging fraud in pro-Ouattara northern regions, and moved to declare Gbagbo the winner of the polls. Now in an unprecedented quandry, Cote d'Ivoire, treachously, has two presidents, two prime ministers, and two cabinets. One man occupies official government buildings in Abidjan, supported by the Ivorian army and youth militia. The other man is holed-up in an Abidjan hotel in a guerilla-style set-up that would almost put a hollywood movie siege scene to shame, protected by UN peacekeepers and backed by the regional and much of the international community. The first round of mediation by Thabo Mbeki appears to have failed. But all key actors recognise the futility of any attempt to forge a power sharing agreement. It just won't work. The fractious post-election coalitions in Kenya and Zimbabwe are ready case studies of the risks in such an approach.
What will happen?
Right now, it's possible that diplomatic isolation could eventually force Gbagbo's own party allies to break with rank, and pressure their boss into talks with Ouattara. But many won't hold breathe. Precedence suggests that this could be a fight to the finish.
All the while the risk of violent confrontations grows. A plan by the Ouattara camp to take over the premises of a state-owned broadcaster RTI, and prime ministerial offices in Plateau, Abidjan will almost certainly be resisted by members of the armed forces loyal to Gbagbo and other pro-Gbagbo militia. Ouattara's camp appear to have lost patience, shifting gears to a more uncompromising position; that Gbagbo has to step down or they will seize power by force.
While the threat of a fresh war is what may eventually bring them to the table with mediators, the big unknown is what happens from there? Ouattara has called for Gbagbo to step down before talks, while Gbagbo will only agree to talks as incumbent president. Possibilities include mediators attempting to get Gbagbo to relinquish his claim to the presidency while talks go on, but he will likely resist without demanding some major concession. I'd argue that we're still far off from a scenario where Gbagbo is forcibly removed (AU and ECOWAS have done this in the past in other countries e.g. Comoros, and Sierra Leone), the consensus between African regional bodies on Ouattara's victory, is unprecedented. If this consensus remains intact (and that's a very big if), Gbagbo could eventually be squeezed out of office, but most likely after some sort of 'safe-exit' deal.
But a more fundamental issue is why incumbents still want to cling on to power in Africa. Is life after political office so dire and downhill that many would rather die at the helm than quit while still ahead? Absolute power does really corrupt absolutely. The revolution that will spur change need not necessarily be bloody. In many African countries that have broken with that mould, it's been a critical mass of civil society activism or internal domestic pressure that has abruptly ended elite ambitions to stay on and cling on at all costs. But in war-fatigued and war-weary Cote d'Ivoire, the question will be who will be the first to lead this clarion call?